Abstract. Square is 8-round SPN structure block cipher and its round function and key schedule have been slightly modified to design building blocks of Rijndael. Key schedule of Square is simple and efficient but fully affine, so we apply a related-key attack on it. We find a 3-round related-key differential trail with probability 2 −28 , which have zero differences both on its input and output states, and this trail is called the local collision in [5] . By extending of this related-key differential, we construct a 7-round related-key boomerang distinguisher and successful attack on full round Square. The best attack on Square have ever been known is the square attack on 6-round reduced variant of Square. In this paper, we present a key recovery attack on the full round of Square using a related-key boomerang distinguisher. We construct a 7-round related-key boomerang distinguisher with probability 2 −119 by finding local collision, and calculate its probability using ladder switch and local amplification techniques. As a result, one round on top of distinguisher is added to construct a full round attack on Square which recovers 16-bit key information with 2 36 encryptions and 2 123 data.
Introduction
The block cipher Square [8] was designed by Joan Daemen, Lars Knudsen, and Vincent Rijmen and two of them are the designers of Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [11] . Since the structure and mathematical logics that used in both block ciphers Square and AES are similar, so Square is considered as a predecessor of AES.
Attacks on AES-192 and AES-256 [4] [5] [6] have been discussed and those attacks are based on the related-key model [1] . In [5] , Biryukov, et al. have shown successful attacks on the full round AES-192 and AES-256 using a related-key boomerang distinguisher, where some helpful techniques have been added such as local collision, Feistel switch, ladder switch, and so on.
In this paper, we construct a related-key boomerang distinguisher with local collision and ladder switch techniques to attack the block cipher Square. In addition, a simple idea local amplification is used to calculate a lower bound to be increased in the value of the distinguisher's probability.
Local amplification is based on the fact that the coincidence of differences at the switching point of both lower trail is enough to construct a related-key boomerang distinguisher, thus we gather these probabilities of trails so that a factor of distinguisher's probability is amplified from 2 −14 to 2 −7 . Therefore, we get a better estimation for probability of distinguisher which is greater than 2 −128 .
Related works
Square is designed under the Wide Trail Strategy to guarantee security against differential and linear cryptanalysis and the designers of Square have claimed that 6-round Square is sufficiently secure against differential and linear cryptanalysis. Also they have given a dedicated attack which is called Square Attack, and by this attack, at most 6-round Square would be attacked with 2 72 complexity. There are no more attack results on the block cipher Square so far.
In 2005, the related-key boomernag attack has been applied to several ciphers KASUMI [3] , COCONUT98 [2] , IDEA [2] , and AES-192/256 [5] . In [3] , authors have given a related key boomerang attack on KASUMI reduced to 6-round out of 8-round with 34 related-keys and 2
13 time complexity, and also they have shown that the full round KASUMI could be attacked with 4 relatedkeys and 2
78.7 time complexity by transforming boomerang attack into chosen ciphertext/adaptive chosen plaintext attack. Full round COCONUT98 was easily distinguished by 1 related-key boomerang quartet with 2 related keys in [2] and the authors presented key recovery attack on 6-round IDEA out of 8.5-round using related-key boomerang distinguisher with 4 related-key and 2 51.6 data complexity.
In 2008, Gorski et al. presented the first related-key boomerang attacks on reduced round of AES-192 [9] . They gave an attack on 7- 
Description of block cipher SQUARE
The size of block, master key, and round keys of Square are all 128-bit. The followings are the different representations of a 128-bit data X ∈ GF(2 x1 x2 x3  x4 x5 x6 x7  x8 x9 x10 x11  x12 x13 x14 x15   =   x0,0 x0,1 x0,2 x0,3  x1,0 x1,1 x1,2 x1,3  x2,0 x2,1 x2,2 x2,3  x3,0 x3,1 x3,2 x3,3 , where x i and x j,k ∈ GF(2 8 ). Let an irreducible polynomial p be p(x) = x 8 + x 4 + x 3 + x + 1 over GF (2) , which is the same one to define the finite field GF(2
Square is an 8-round SPN block cipher with 9 round keys. The round transformation ρ, which is a composition of four functions such as θ, γ, π, and σ, is as the following.
The θ consists of 4 times of row-wise matrix multiplications over GF (2 8 
The γ is a byte-wise S-box operation with identical S-boxes. Since no specific S-box is given in [8] , we choose an S-box which is the same as to AES. The choice of S-box can affect the complexity of our attack. However, every S-box defined by an affine transformation of inversion over a finite field GF(2 8 ) have the same aspect against our attack, and this kind of S-box is the most wide used one. Therefore, our assumption does not lose generality. The π is a transposition of 4 × 4 data array and the σ is a round key addition.
The key schedule of Square is quite similar to the key schedule of AES-128. Adding S-boxes and transposition of round keys are the only modification to the key schedule of AES-128. Figure 1 shows structure of key schedule of Square.
Let rk 0 , rk 1 , · · · , rk 8 be nine 128-bit round keys the first round key rk 0 be the master key K. Each i-th round key rk i (i = 0, 1, · · · , 8) is regarded as a 4 × 4 byte array and let rk i j represent the j-th row of i-th round key. The round key generation function ψ generates each row of the (i + 1)-th round key from the i-th round key as follows.
The byte rotation function, rotl : GF(2 and each C i is a constant generated from the previous constant
the block cipher
Square is represented by the following composition of functions.
Local Collision of SQUARE
The idea of local collision property is firstly used for cryptanalysis of hash functions [7] and it has been used to attack block ciphers in the related-key attack model [5] . We find a family of related-key differentials of block cipher Square in which a local collision occurs as described in Figure A = {0a, 11, 17, 1d, 20, 3b, 4d, 53, 73, 76, 7c, 87, 9d, a4, a8, ae, c6, d2, d5, e0, ee, fc}.
Throughout this paper, we let denote one byte difference value 0x0a, because each probability of differential in Figure 2 , where each element in the set A regarded as , is all equal to 2 −28 . Note that symbols and are calculated as 0x14 and 0x1e by the matrix M, respectively.
Let C i be a composition of σ function of i-th round and three following round functions such as
Then we can construct a trail of 3-round related-key differential denoted by C i as described in Figure 3 .
In Figure 3 , an input difference of C i is canceled by i-th round key difference ∆rk i so that the input difference of the next round function ρ rk i+2 becomes to equal to ∆rk i+1 . During the procedure that ∆rk i+1 is transformed into ∆rk i+2 with probability 1 by the function ψ, ∆rk i+1 is transformed into ∆rk i+2 with probability 2 −28 via the other way induced from the functions θ, γ, and π. Therefore, the probability of the related-key differential trail of C i is 2 −28 , and it is easy to check that the probability of the the same trail in reverse direction is also 2 −28 . Using the related-key differential trail described above, we construct a 7-round related-key distinguisher with probability greater than 2 −128 .
Related-key Boomerang Attack
In this section, related-key boomerang attack is explained in briefly together with additional techniques, such as local amplification and ladder switch.
Boomerang Distinguisher and Related-Key Attack Model
A block cipher E K : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n with an arbitrary key K can be represented by a composition of two sub-ciphers E0 K and E1 K , where E K = E1 K • E0 K . If there exist both differentials (∆P → ∆Y ) for E0 K and (∆Y → ∆P ) for E0 −1 K with probability p, and a differential (∇C → ∇Y ) for E1 −1 K with probability q. Then, for a chosen plaintext pair (P 1 , P 2 ) such that P 1 ⊕ P 2 = ∆P , the corresponding plaintext pair (Q 1 , Q 2 ) calculated by
satisfies Q 1 ⊕ Q 2 = ∆P with the boomerang probability p 2 q 2 . In the related-key attack model, attackers need to know or choose relations between several keys. The relation between keys for this attack is simply difference. Since the structure of the key schedule of Square is fully linear or affine, each operation for key schedule preserves difference properties. So, no matter what a key differential trail is assumed to be used, its probability is always 1.
The related-key boomerang attack uses 2 or more related-keys, and we consider 4 related-keys K1, K2, K3, and K4 for our attack which have the following relations,
The related-key boomerang distinguisher with above related-keys is described as follows. Assume that both the probabilities of related-key differential (∆P → ∆Y ) for E0 ∆K and of (∆Y → ∆P ) for E0 −1 ∆K are p, and the probability of a related-key differential (∇C → ∇Y ) for E1 −1 ∇K is q, where the notation E ∆K implies a pair of encryption E with related-key pair whose difference is ∆K. Then, for a chosen plaintext pair (P 1 , P 2 ) such that P 1 ⊕ P 2 = ∆P , the corresponding plaintext pair (Q 1 , Q 2 ) calculated by
satisfies Q 1 ⊕ Q 2 = ∆P with the boomerang probability p 2 q 2 . Boomerang distinguisher is a special case of related-key boomerang distinguisher with ∆K = ∇K = 0.
Additional Techniques
A boomerang distinguisher enables us to estimate the lower bound of probability that we successfully observe the distinguishing property. We can estimate the lower bound more precisely by using the following techniques.
Local Amplification. In E1, contrary to plain boomerang distinguisher, both output differences E1
do not need to be equal to a value ∇Y , it is enough that they are equal to each other to satisfy the following equation,
Suppose
and let r denote the probability of differential (∇D → ∇Y ) for e −1 0 . Then the probability of differential trail (∇C → ∇D → ∇Y ) is bounded below by q =q × r.
If there exist other ∇Y 0 , ∇Y 1 , · · · , ∇Y n−1 with corresponding nonzero probabilities r i (i = 0, 1, · · · , n − 1) of differentials (∇D → ∇Y i )(i = 0, 1, · · · , n − 1) for e −1 0 , then we can denote each probability of differential trail (∇C → ∇D → ∇Y i ) by q i =q × r i for i = 0, 1, · · · , n − 1. So the probability that the equation (1) holds is estimated by the sum of all q 2 i for i = 0, 1, · · · , n − 1 and we denote this probability byq
Therefore, we have the following probability of locally amplified boomerang distinguisher,
Ladder Switch. Briyukov et. al have proposed a technique in [5] which minimizes the number of active S-boxes in a boomerang distinguisher. They use the parallelism of S-box operations so that some of S-boxes can be regarded as parts of E0 and the others as parts of E1.
If there exist an S-box which is active when it is regraded as a part of E1, but not a part of E0, then we define E0 by the previous functions of the substitution layer and the target S-box. And also we define E1 by the rest of S-boxes other than the target S-box and functions after the substitution layer. Then the probability of the boomerang distinguisher is independent with the target S-box.
The Trails and Related-Key Boomerang Distinguisher

Related-key differential trails for E0 and E1
A related-key boomerang distinguisher of our attack consists of two similar related-key differential trails E0 and E1 depicted in Figure 4 and Figure 5 . E0 and E1 are divided so as to apply the ladder switch technique as follows. Let S i,j be the i-th S-box of the j-th column, where γ is considered as a 4 × 4 array of S-boxes. In γ of 5-th round, only one S-box S 0,1 is included in E0 and others are included E1, because in the related-key differentials of E0 and E1 that we use, S 0,1 of 5-th round is active in E1 but not active in E0. So we do not pay probability 2 −7 for S 0,1 of 5-th round by including the S-box in E0. We define E0 by S 0,1 • θ • C 1 and we know that the probability of related-key differential C 1 is 2 −28 . The first row (0x0a, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0a) of output difference of C 1 is transformed into (0x1e, 0x00, 0x14, 0x0a) by the matrix M thus S 0,1 of the last round in E0 is not an active S-box. Therefore, the probability of relatedkey differential trail of E0 is still 2 −28 (see Figure 4) , and the probability p in equation (2) 
, and e 0 = π • (γ \ S 0,1 ). Then, we consider E1 as a composition of two sub-functions e 0 and C 5 so we apply the local amplification to calculate the differential probability of E1. Differential trail of E1 proceeds in reverse direction(see Figure 5 ). The probability of related-key differential trail for C −7 for 126 values of ∇y i , and 2 −6 for 1 value of ∇y i . If we let the probability of related-key differential (0x0a → ∇y i ) by r i for each ∇y i then probability of related-key differential trail from ∇C to ∇Y i by E1 −1 ∇K is q i = 2 −28 × r i .
7-Round related-key Boomerang Distinguisher
As discussed above, p = 2 −28 and q i = 2 −28 × r i for each ∇Y i . The probability which a pair (X 1 , X 2 ) with difference ∆X is transformed into the output pair (X 3 , X 4 ) whose difference is ∆X, through the related-key boomerang distinguisher depicted in Figure 6 is
There are 127 values for ∇Y i which have nonzero probabilities r i and among these ∇Y i , 126 values have the probability 2 −7 and one value has the probability 2 −6 . Therefore, the related-key boomerang quartet (X 1 , X 2 , X 3 , X 4 ) which satisfies all trails of distinguisher, occurs with the probability
and we call this quartet as right quartet. T K in the Figure 6 is going to be discussed in the following section.
Additional Round T
As depicted in Figure 6 , an additional round T , before E0 is need to make E1 • E0 • T to be full round Square. Let us define T as follows.
By the linearity of θ, σ, and ψ, T can be represented by
For this attack, related-key differential trail of the additional round T in Figure 7 is used. T contains S-box layer γ which has 2 active S-boxes in it, so the probability of this differential trail is strictly smaller than 1. However, we can construct a structure(set of pairs) such that a fixed portion of plaintext pairs always satisfy the trail. In T , if we consider a set of plaintext pairs with differences ∆P , where ∆P is an arbitrary element of the set P defined by P = {(α, β, 0a, 1e, 00, 00, 00, 00, 14, 0a, 0a, 1e, 00, 00, 00, 00)|α, β ∈ GF(2 8 )}. (3) Then, output differences of all pairs must be ∆X with ratio 2 −16 . 
Differential trails of round keys
As we pointed out above, the round function ψ of key schedule of Square preserves XOR operation, so a master key difference generates only one key differential trail with probability 1. Two key differential trails derived from master key differences ∆K and ∇K for our attack are depicted in Figure 8 . Note that the gray parts of the key differential trails are not used for this attack. The trail derived from ∆K is for sub-cipher E0 and from ∇K is for E1, and these key differential trails occur local collisions both in E0 ∆K and E1 ∇K . We consider a fixed difference value ∆S defined by ∆S = (00, 00, 0a, 1e, 00, 00, 00, 00, 14, 0a, 0a, 1e, 00, 00, 00, 00).
In order to generate each structure S, we choose arbitrary 8-bit constants c i ∈ GF(2 8 ) for i = 0, 1, · · · , 13, and define the following sets of plaintexts, P 1 and
The set P 1 is a collection of 2 16 plaintexts where all bytes are fixed except for the first two bytes. The set P 2 is the collection of 2 16 plaintexts generated by exclusive OR for each element in P 1 with ∆S.
Note that the number of elements of both P 1 and P 2 are 2 16 . We define a set S of 2 33 ordered pairs as the following,
In S, there are 2 33−16 = 2 17 pairs which satisfy the related-key differential trail for T as described in Figure 7 , and we expect one right quartet per 2 119−17 = 2 102 structures. Let 2 m be the number of structures, then m > 102 for this attack.
Attack Procedure
Let us define the ciphertext difference ∇C by ∇C = (0a, 00, 0a, 00, 00, 00, 00, 0a, 0a, 00, 00, 00, 00, 00, 00, 0a).
The attack is done by the following steps for 2 m structures specified above.
1. Generate a structure S as described above. 2. For every element (P 1 , P 2 ) in S, do the following steps.
(a) Calculate C 1 = E K1 (P 1 ) and C 2 = E K2 (P 2 ).
K4 (C 2 ⊕∇C), and ∆Q = P 3 ⊕P 4 . (c) If ∆Q / ∈ P for P defined in (3), filter out out the quartet ((P 1 , P 2 ), (P 3 , P 4 )) (112-bit filter). (d) If first two bytes difference of ∆Q can not be derived from 0x0a and 0x0a by inverse S-box operations, and exclusive OR with 0x14 and 0x0a respectively, then filter out the quartet(2-bit filter). 3. If every quartet is filtered out, return to step 1. 4. For every candidate for the first two bytes of θ(K3), do the following steps.
(a) Calculate each candidate for the first two bytes of θ(K1), θ(K2), and θ(K4). (b) For every remained quartet, partially encrypt first two bytes of P 3 and P 4 with θ(K3) and θ(K4) for T . If the first two bytes of output difference of T are 0x0a and 0x0a, do the following step.
-Partially encrypt first two bytes of P 1 and P 2 with θ(K1) and θ(K2) for T . If the first two bytes of output difference of T are 0x0a and 0x0a, then increase counter for the θ(K3).
After this procedures for 2 m structures, mostly counted 16-bit value is regarded as the first two bytes of θ(K3).
Attack Analysis
To prepare m = 104 structures for 4 right quartets, we need 2 104+17 = 2 121 plaintexts and 2 encryptions and 2 decryptions for each plaintexts, so the data complexity of this attack is 2 123 . We expect that 2 104+33−114 = 2 23 quartets are left after filtering, and for each 2 16 guessed partial keys, 4 times of 1/32 partial encryptions are needed for each quartet, so number of encryption for this attack does not exceed 2 23+16+2−5 = 2 36 . A pair (P 3 , P 4 ) after filtering, proposes 4 candidates of 16-bit key information for first two bytes of both θ(K3) and θ(K4) and their related-key bytes are counted by pair (P 1 , P 2 ) with probability 2 −16 , so a quartet after filtering proposes one candidate of 16-bit key information with probability 2 −14 . We have 2 16 candidates for first two bytes of each θ(K1), θ(K2), θ(K3), and θ(K4), and 2 23 pairs after filtering, thus every single candidate except for right key is proposed with probability 2 23−14−16 = 2 −7 compare to 4 for right key. Therefore, we regard this ratio as the signal to noise ratio as follows, After this attack, we have the first two bytes of θ(K1), θ(K2), θ(K3), and θ(K4). Other bytes of each key can be recovered exhaustive search for 2 112 keys. Therefore, we can find a secret key of block cipher Square faster than exhaustive search in related-key attack model. 
Conclusions
We present a related-key boomerang attack on the full round Square. We find a 3-round related-key differential trail with high probability by local collision finding technique and construct 7-round boomerang distinguisher with them. Also, to estimate the distinguisher's probability more close to the real probability, we introduce local amplification technique and apply ladder switch. Even if this attack is not practical, considering similarity between Square and AES-128 including key schedule, security of AES-128 against related-key attack model is still open.
